Two months after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, a reconnaissance team from the University of Notre Dame traveled to Léogâne with a follow up trip in August 2010. The team sought to determine the failure modes for residential housing in the area and survey the structural systems, construction materials, building practices, and non-engineering constraints that dictate these practices. The failure modes observed were commonly initiated from undersized=under-reinforced columns, though even structures with adequately sized columns sustained significant damage due to shear forces transferred by stiff but brittle unreinforced masonry walls. Inadequate seismic detailing of reinforced concrete elements, deficient materials and construction practices, and lack of seismic considerations in the design of structural systems with sufficient lateral interconnectivity were also observed. Finally, strategies now being pursued by the authors will be showcased in an effort to develop multihazard-resilient housing that can be sustained locally.
INTRODUCTION
The nation of Haiti historically had not been immune to seismic activity; however, excluding the 1946 earthquake in the Dominican Republic, the faults on this shared island have laid dormant for over 100 years until 12 January 2010. The tremendous devastation of this event can largely be attributed to the many political and economic issues that faced this nation, whose struggles with education, government oversight of civil works, and general lack of resources historically prohibited the establishment of reliable civil infrastructure. As a nation with no seismic activity in recent decades and regularly afflicted by seasonal rains and tropical storms and hurricanes, any ad hoc considerations in design and construction were directed toward these events. Further, as the poorest Western nation, Haiti struggled, even before the earthquake, to provide its people with basic necessities, so it is not surprising that hazard resilience of civil infrastructure was given low priority.
The devastation of this earthquake was particularly apparent in the city of Léogâne, located 29 km west of Port-au-Prince and approximately 20 km west of the epicenter of the quake, with a population close to 130,000 people (GeoNames 2010). Damages to 93% of the buildings in Léogâne are estimated, the majority corresponding to collapses (Eberhard et al. 2010) . These reports of extensive structural failures in Léogâne, where the authors' a) University of Notre Dame, 156 Fitzpatrick Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556 institution maintains a program to combat the spread of lymphatic filariasis, motivated them to form a research team to identify a sustainable, hazard-resilient residential housing model for its people. This process began with two trips to Léogâne: the first in March 2010 with the goal of performing reconnaissance to understand the reasons for the extensive structural failures and the second in August 2010 to observe the progress of reconstruction, to speak with local architects and engineers to understand the best mechanisms to disseminate new knowledge and practices, and to engage local families to understand the functional requirements of a home and the economic resources available to them for reconstruction. It must be emphasized that the development of a sustainable, resilient housing model cannot be achieved without understanding the economic and societal constraints and requirements for Haitian homes and the local construction technologies, materials and practices, as well as the vulnerabilities these practices and materials create within the current housing model. To achieve this end, this paper first presents the major findings of the research team, with particular emphasis on the reconnaissance work from the March 2010 visit to Léogâne and observations of the reconstruction efforts there. Although the authors' focus is on residential housing in Léogâne, case studies include a Holy Cross school in Port-au-Prince to underscore the vulnerabilities created by nonstructural elements, even in an aseismically designed structure. It then outlines the considerations necessary for a long-term plan for sustainable, rebuilding of the residential housing stock.
HOUSING REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
As in any country, Haitian housing trends are predicated on cultural and environmental requirements, subject to practical constraints related to the lack of native resources, income, education and government oversight. Prior to the January 2010 earthquake, it was estimated that the average annual income of a Haitian was $250-400 USD (CIA 2010) . With 80% of the population living under the poverty line and 54% living in what is termed "abject" poverty, most cannot afford quality materials or the services of professional construction teams. On top of the widespread poverty, Haiti also has the highest import taxes in the Western Hemisphere, implying that the general Haitian population cannot rely heavily on imported materials. Sadly, indigenous construction materials are quite limited. Since the French colonization of the island in the 1600s, the island has slowly become 95% deforested, making construction grade wood as expensive as steel. As a result, most housing in urban areas like Léogâne employ a combination of reinforced concrete columns, often without beams, and unreinforced masonry walls as their primary structural system for both single and multistory homes. It is important to note immediately that, since the average Haitian was unaware of the possibility for a strong earthquake, their approach to design and construction of their homes, which was not regulated by any municipal code, made no explicit consideration for seismic effects or the conscious implementation of structural systems (e.g., confined masonry or reinforced load bearing masonry walls) detailed appropriately for such effects. The high cost of imported steel implies that the amount of reinforcement used in construction is often compromised. Concrete is mixed on site, often by hand using water from adjacent shallow wells, and while crushed large aggregates are available, cost often drives the use of more affordable smooth river-rocks. Similarly, cheaper fine aggregates, such as beach sand containing salts that reduce concrete durability and strength, are commonly employed despite the availability of superior materials. Walls are constructed using unreinforced concrete masonry units (CMU), hand pressed locally using sand and cement, with wide ranging quality again proportional to cost. Figure 1 shows a few examples of construction materials used widely in Léogâne.
In light of this extreme poverty and the lack of any lending and financing system, the construction of a home progresses as funds become available and is designed in the absence of a municipal building code. This leads to an incremental construction model (Figure 2) , not uncommon throughout the world (Youd 2000) , and implies that homes can take a significant amount of time to complete (on the order of eight to nine years for a three story urban Figure 1 . Construction materials widely in Léogâne: (a) CMU block, (b) smooth river rock used as concrete aggregate, (c) beach sand used in concrete, and (d) hand press used to make CMU blocks in the streets. Photo credits: B. Grissinger, B. Dolan.
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home). As a result, urban housing often affords the provision to add floors later, as funds become available, so flat concrete slabs often serve not only as floors but also as roof systems in many multistory homes (Figure 2 ). In many cases, the slabs are not strictly formed from reinforced concrete, but rather CMU may be placed as fillers and the concrete is then cast around them to form the slab (Figure 3 ). Longitudinal reinforcement commonly protrudes from these roof slabs to facilitate column splices for an additional floor if funds become available. Such incremental construction practices result in high variability in materials and workmanship, depending on the budget available as each stage of the home is completed and created vulnerabilities in some multistory homes in the January 2010 earthquake. Additionally, the tropical climate of Haiti plays an important role in residential housing design, as the island is also subject to tropical storms, creating high resistance requirements against rain, strong winds, and flooding. This, as well as the aforementioned economic constraints, further justified the heavy concrete and masonry construction. Unfortunately, while these practices may have proven effective against strong winds, they resulted in significantly greater seismic mass during earthquakes, generating not only larger forces but also constituting significantly heavier debris. Furthermore, cultural preferences toward privacy and security also played a pivotal role in residential housing design with respect to building envelopes and partitioning. Security concerns further supported the use of CMU for the building envelope and led to the common practice of either vented decorative concrete bricks or iron bars for windows and iron gates for doors. Even open air porches were commonly enclosed with ironwork that ultimately damaged primary structural elements. In reference to the privacy within a household, the authors' interaction with Haitian families suggests a preference toward homes with defined spaces and rooms. Even in some of the poorer areas, the authors found that it was common for a family to request a four-room, single story house, with enough space to separately accommodate the adults, children, and communal spaces. This can be contrasted with housing models adopted in other developing countries following disasters, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, where interior partitioning was not required or was considerably lighter due to a cultural acceptance of more communal living spaces (Hansen 2005) . Such Haitian cultural preferences are again significant to note as interior partitioning using CMU will be shown later to have been a major contributor to the failures observed, making the need for an alternate partitioning system paramount to a culturally viable housing model. Not only had CMU become a critical element in housing for security and privacy, but it also served an important role in construction. Due to the deforestation issues, the availability of wood for formwork is quite limited; therefore building CMU walls first adjacent to rebar cages anchored in the slab or foundation has an important practical implication: it effectively provides "formwork" for up to two sides of a column. The formwork for the remaining sides of the column is planked with available scrap wood (Figure 4 ). Due to this construction practice, it is fairly common for the size of the CMU blocks to dictate the size of the concrete columns used, regardless of the lateral or even gravity demands of the structure. The most common practice witnessed by the research team were poorly-confined, undersized columns measuring 16x16 cm (6.3x6.3 in) with 4 longitudinal bars (typically no. 3 and in some cases smooth) and transverse reinforcement with a spacing of 20 cm (8 inches) and a 90 hook ( Figure 5) Note that this construction sequence does resemble that of confined masonry, common for aseismic design throughout the developing world (Coburn and Spence 2002) , and is often termed as such by foreign architects and engineers practicing in Haiti. Admittedly it is very difficult to distinguish through field reconnaissance and interviews with local builders whether the systems in Haiti were confined masonry systems (or other similar systems) simply implemented improperly or systems whose construction sequence merely resembles confined masonry. However there is compelling evidence to suggest the latter: 1. Haitians admitted openly that seismic effects were not the prime consideration in their construction practices; they were not even aware of their seismic risk and were not attempting to implement an aseismic design concept and its various requirements. 2. As will be demonstrated later in Figure 19 and especially Figure 20 , the proper keying of the block at the interface with the columns is ignored, which is considered one of the essential tenets of confined masonry construction. 3. Horizontal reinforcement through the CMUs is consistently neglected. 4. Beams were commonly not present in the construction, and when they were, there was a lack of development of reinforcement between the columns and beams 5. Haitians employ a smaller, weaker brick and with larger voids (CMU), instead of a more solid, typically kiln-fired, brick material, common to confined masonry systems.
In multistory homes, once all the CMU walls are constructed and concrete columns cast, plywood sheets are shored up to create a formwork for the concrete slab ( Figure 6a ). Thus the floors can be considered flat plates, devoid of beams to tie the lateral system and without the presence of column capitals or drop panels that would increase the shear and moment resistance of the system (Taranath, 1998) . In the case of low-income, single-story houses, the CMU walls and columns are often topped with a wood-framed, corrugated metal roofing system, often without the presence of a ring beam (Figure 6b ).
RECONNAISSANCE: CASE STUDIES
Based on the field reconnaissance in Léogâne, the authors identified several recurring failure mechanisms:
• Shear Failures: Rigid CMU walls or even ironwork over openings that is sufficiently stiff to attract seismic forces but with insufficient strength to resist them, transferring significant shear forces to adjacent columns upon failure 
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• "Short Column" Effect: Partial height infill CMU walls in concrete frames significantly reduced the effective length of the columns, a factor not accounted for in their design.
• Flexible Diaphragms: Flat plates lacked sufficient diaphragm action to engage columns and form an effective lateral system in homes with elongated floor plans.
Contributing factors to the above failure mechanisms:
• Columns not sized for strength but for constructability (match depth of CMU), inadequately detailed=confined.
• Excessive Mass: reinforced concrete floor=roof systems, CMU used for all partitions.
• Poor materials (concrete mixed from smooth river rock, beach sands), often separation of large aggregates from the mix in casting.
• Incremental construction, causing significant variation in material quality and workmanship.
A few case studies are presented next to illustrate the kinds of failure modes and vulnerabilities in urban construction that were identified by the authors. Some of the case studies focus on specific buildings and others offer more general observed trends. With the exception of the first case study, presented to reiterate the vulnerabilities introduced by CMU walls even in well-engineered concrete frames, all other case studies refer to construction in Léogâne. The Latitude and Longitude coordinates are provided in parenthesis (N , W ) when appropriate. Note that the entire database of reconnaissance executed by the authors can be viewed online at http://haiti.ce.nd.edu.
BASIL MOREAU SCHOOL, PORT-AU-PRINCE (N18.52841 , W72.38075 )
The Basil Moreau School was built in Port-au-Prince by the Congregation of the Holy Cross and from all external observations, is a well-engineered, aseismically designed structure. The school is a three-story building with a structural system consisting of a reinforced concrete moment resisting frame supporting a reinforced concrete slab, with infill CMU walls. The structure is built on a plot with a variable grade, so the ground floor columns are different heights on opposing sides of the building. It is clear that this fact was taken into account in the seismic design however, as the shorter columns have considerably larger dimensions and appear to be designed for the increased shear demands (Figure 7) . Column dimensions ranged from 35x35cm (14x14in) [top floor] to 70x70cm (28x28in) [shorter columns in ground floor]. On the second and third floors, the frames in the longitudinal direction are infilled with CMU walls to either the mid or three quarters height of the column height ( Figure 8a ). The remaining space is filled with a louvered aluminum venting system. Unfortunately, these walls created a "short column" effect evidenced by large shear cracks that failed all the columns on the second floor. The shear failures exposed rows of three #4 longitudinal reinforcement bars with transverse reinforcement near the beam-column joints on the order of 15-20cm (6-8in) hooked only 90 (Figure 8b ). The restraint offered by the partial height CMU infill walls, leading to a reduction in the effective length, was clearly not considered as it would have necessitated greater provision for shear effects in their design. Sliding shear failure was also prevalent in the walls in the transverse direction, particularly adjacent to the staircases, though no walls experienced out of plane failure.
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THREE STORY HOUSE IN CENTRAL LÉ OGÂ NE (N18.51457 , W72.6335 )
The second case study is a three-story residence located in the central district of Léo-gâne adopting the flat plate system defined in a previous section. The house has a rather elongated floor plan that was short in the direction parallel to the street but ran deep into the lot. On all three floors, the structure showed evidence of sliding shear cracks in walls running into the plot and diagonal shear cracks in walls running in the opposing direction, parallel with the street. The house was heavily partitioned with unreinforced CMU walls, particularly toward the back of the home, which housed the kitchen and bathrooms ventilated by relatively small windows. The front of the home had considerably larger rooms with wider, barred windows, particularly on the street face. In comparison to other houses in Léogâne, this is considered a high-end home built with funds unavailable to most of the population and designed by a local architect also responsible for many commercial and medical facilities in the area. This particular house showcased the recurring failure observed: damage to the columns initiated by shear failure of CMU walls that attract significant shear forces, but have insufficient strength for the seismic demands and exhibit brittle failures expressed by diagonal in-plane shear cracks. As shown in the second floor of this structure, the CMU ultimately failed out of plane, falling into the street (Figure 9a) 1 . As Figure 7 . Basil Moreau School in Port-au-Prince. Note the size difference in the ground floor columns with those in the upper stories, the failure in the second floor columns and the extensive shoring currently used to support structure.
1 Similar vulnerabilities attributed to metal gates and barred windows were also observed at other locations in Léogâne, including a two-story structure located at (N18.51430 , W72.6339 ), which is revisited later in Figure  17 .
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witnessed time and again in other earthquakes around the world, this is all a consequence of columns designed for frame action but ultimately failing by shear action (Jain 2002) . Ultimately damage to the ground floor columns (Figure 9b ) led to a permanent drift sufficient to warrant the demolition of the structure. The shear failures induced by stiff masonry walls were prominent throughout Léogâne and often led to even more dramatic column failures, as shown in Figure 10 . Another classic failure pattern observed in this case study and throughout downtown Léogâne was pounding between adjacent structures (Figure 11a ), which cased the masonry wall at (N18.51457 , W72.6335 ) to deflect more than 7 cm (Figure 11b ). This scenario unfortunately played out far differently in other collapsed structures in Léogâne, where pounding led to the direct failure of undersized columns.
HOUSES IN WEALTHIER AREA OF LÉ OGÂ NE
The houses discussed in this subsection are located on the northeast side of Léogâne, the wealthier neighborhood of the city. Most houses in this area have relatively larger room dimensions, with column spacing of typically 4-5 m (13-16.5 ft), ultimately larger floor plans [160-220 m 2 (1720-2365 ft
2 )], and many go as high as three stories. Despite the comparatively larger floor plans, the same structural system and construction practices used for smaller homes in the denser downtown area were extended to these homes. A collapsed three-story home in this area (N18.51495 , W72.62756 ) provides an interesting example of this phenomenon. While some neighboring homes experienced the same collapse sequence, often the concrete slabs would be largely intact, but in this instance, even the slab displayed a brittle failure (Figure 12a) , which illustrates the poor quality of materials used. The typical slab thickness of 15-17 cm (6-6.8 in) for these homes was found to be reasonably sized for gravity demands, meeting the minimum thickness requirement as stated in ACI 318-08 (ACI 2008). However, when employing columns 3.5-4 m (11.5-13.2 ft) apart, their cross section should be on the order of 25-30 cm (10-12 in) square, just to satisfy minimum design requirements and does not consider additional lateral resistance requirements for earthquakes. The columns observed were 16Â16 cm 
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(6.4Â6.4 in) with four #4 longitudinal reinforcement bars and transverse reinforcement with spacing approximately 20 cm (8 in), implying they were a quarter of these minimum recommendations. In fact, regardless of the size of the home or the number of stories, column sizing is largely uniform and dictated, as discussed earlier, by the size of the CMU walls used as part of the formwork. As a result, virtually every home in this area exhibited catastrophic failure. This practice creates an additional vulnerability since the diaphragmatic function of the slab is inadequate and the columns are thus not sufficiently engaged as to provide as a unified lateral system. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the fact that most of these houses have multiple floors, leading to increased shear forces on the ground floor columns. Since column size is not selected based on any earthquake design criteria, or even the number of stories, but rather chosen based on dimension of CMU blocks, columns are grossly undersized for the seismic demands. The result: a highly vulnerable system that resulted in repeated pancake collapses throughout this wealthy district in Léogâne. In many cases, the largely intact slabs showed evidence of punching shear (N18.51627 , W72.62913
; Figure 12b ).
Within this district of Léogâne, there were older, even larger concrete homes that still exhibited soft story failures, often due to the vulnerabilities created by incremental construction (N18.51452 , W72.62413 ; Figure 13 ). Though these homes still lacked beams, they appeared to have larger columns and deeper slabs. In fact, a rather impressive home at (N18.51471 , W72.62046 ), whose slab was perforated by an open entrance hall that extended the full height of the structure, sustained significant damage (Figure 14a ). The structure exhibited not only classic failures of CMU walls (both in-plane and out-of-plane shear failures) but also hinging in the first floor interior columns (Figure 14b ), leading to eventual partial collapse of the second story. 
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ONE STORY HOUSE IN POOR AREA OF LÉ OGÂ NE (N18.5077 , W72.6350 )
The next case study is of a one story house on the poorer western side of Léogâne. This area is densely populated and consists of a variety of different housing types, assembled based on the availability of materials at the time of construction. The home presented in this case study represents a typical lower-income home and employs mildly reinforced concrete columns and CMU walls without evidence of a ring beam tying the system at the top of the walls. The roof system consists of a timber frame, covered in corrugated tin roofing, similar to that shown previously in Figure 6b . The house's layout is a square, with two interior walls bisecting each direction to split the house into four equal rooms, each 3-4 m (9.8-13.1 ft) square. One of the interior walls is taller than the two exterior walls running parallel with it, in order to accomplish a gable style roof. There was evidence of columns at each of the four corners of the structure, but it is unclear if there were any interior columns.
It is evident that the smaller scale of the house and its single-story design and comparatively lighter roof system, diminished the seismic demands so that vulnerabilities in the lateral system and the sizing and reinforcement of the columns were not exposed; however, the home still experienced in-plane shear cracking in the CMU walls, some of which failed out of plane. Although these damages were nonstructural in nature, they posed considerable safety risks to the family due to the weight of the collapsing CMU walls that were yet to be replaced at the time of the authors' August 2010 visit. At that point the family was occupying the remaining rooms of the home, repairing cracks to these CMU walls with mortar. This family was fortunate; however, many others in Léogâne experienced total collapse of similar homes and as of August 2010 were still awaiting temporary shelters.
SURVIVING SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT LÉ OGÂ NE
Even though a significant percentage of the buildings in Léogâne were either collapsed or severely damaged, there were some instances of buildings that performed well during the 
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seismic event. It is important for future rebuilding efforts to understand the important characteristics of these structures that contributed to their survival. It should be pointed out that in many of the houses that remained structurally intact, significant shear cracking and outof-plane collapse were identified in the walls. Such nonstructural failures should not be discounted as they could lead to significant injuries.
One type of structure that performed relatively well in Léogâne is the wood-framed homes on Grand Rue Street (Figure 15 ). These historic structures date as far back as the 1800s, as European influences mixed with Haitian architecture. Although many of them show significant signs of aging and deterioration, these comparatively lighter structures, framed and partitioned completely in wood, survived the earthquake with little damage. By comparison neighboring reinforced concrete structures had severe damage and most of them suffered complete collapse. It should be noted though that this model of construction, though proven effective in this seismic event, is an unrealistic solution for sustainable future rebuilding, due of lack of local construction grade wood.
Another noteworthy success is the use of reinforced concrete moment-resisting frames. The isolated examples of these structures demonstrated how a properly engaged lateral system could respond favorably. In some cases, part of the structural frame was exposed, with the CMU wall recessed away from the perimeter of the structure. This provides what is commonly referred to as a "wrap-around porch." Consequently, since there was no interaction between the structural frame and the masonry walls at these locations, there was also no mechanism to transfer concentrated shear forces and columns suffered no visible signs of damage. The two-story structure shown in Figure 16 and located at (N18. 51048 , W72.63190 ) is on the same street as the aforementioned historic wooden houses. Again this is an area where extensive damage was observed to all other surrounding reinforced concrete structures, which appeared to be a mixture of both commercial and residential. Significant shear cracking is evident in the masonry walls, and these damages will need to be repaired, but these cracks did not lead to compromise of the structural integrity due to the effective isolation from the primary frame system. It should be pointed out that the columns themselves Figure 15 . Timber framed houses that survived the earthquake. Notice the completely collapsed reinforced structured next to them.
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are also considerably larger than those seen in other areas, which also contributed to the better performance. Again, this was made possible due to sheer economics-the ability to afford a better engineered structure and the formwork necessary to create free-standing moment resisting frames whose column sizes were then not dictated by the dimension of CMU used as partial formwork. CMU was then used as originally intended-as a nonstructural infill secondary in the construction sequence, as opposed to a primary element.
REPAIRS AND REBUILDING PRACTICES
After eight months of deplorable living conditions, it was evident in the August 2010 trip that the Haitian people were anxious to rebuild. Part of the goal of the second trip of the research team was to observe and understand the types of repairs and rebuilding techniques that the Haitians were implementing and relating those approaches back to their initial observations and understanding of local construction practices. With respect firstly to the structural repairs that the research team witnessed, most of them were related to hinged columns. There were two main approaches to repairing the columns. The first was to cast another column next to the previous one. An example is the store front for the house described in the first footnote, where columns of an open air porch were damaged by stiff ironwork. A new column was cast in this case next to the old one but not tied to the existing beam, creating a structure that could carry gravity loads but would not have the intended Figure 16 . Two story structure with columns isolated from the CMU walls. While CMU walls did sustain some shear cracking, they did not create vulnerabilities for the primary structural system. lateral resistance (Figure 17 ). The second common repair for hinged columns was to simply recast concrete around the already failed column, including the yielded reinforcement, which clearly will not restore the compromised lateral resistance of the structure. An example of this type of repair can be seen in the building located in (N18.51430 , W72.6339 ) and demonstrated in Figure 18 , where shear failure of the CMU walls, along with the action of the metal gate, had led to hinging of all ground floor columns.
As far as rebuilding goes, the same structural systems are being used with wellintentioned minor adjustments that do not truly bolster the structure's seismic resistance. One foreman interviewed had spent some time in France recently, where he learned of the new techniques that he was using in the re-construction of homes. At the site of the threestory house that suffered a brittle collapse in the wealthy area in Léogâne (see Figure 12a) , there was brand new construction taking place. The type of construction differed very little from what had occupied the space previously, with CMU walls being primary in the construction and consequently determining the size of the columns (Figure 19 ). The first floor was not completed at the time of the visit; however the foreman on site stated that he was looking to eventually go up to as much as five floors, retaining the same flat plate system used previously for this 220 m 2 (2368 ft 2 ) floor plan, with a few new measures to try to enhance the performance of the structure. The CMU walls were being partitioned, at third points between columns, by adding two longitudinal bars and tied by half stirrups. While the walls at this site were only about halfway completed, at neighboring sites this partitioning of CMU walls was furthered by the addition of intermediate horizontal reinforcement at 
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the wall mid-height, cast into a beam tied into the columns at either end of the wall, as shown in Figure 20 . While the columns cross sectional area had not been increased, the transverse reinforcement was doubled, now spaced on the order of 10 cm (4 in), though still employing 90 hooks. There was also no evidence that beams would be incorporated into (a) Reconstruction has started to take place in Léogâne. This is the site of the total collapse seen in Figure 12a . The construction varies very little and the same structural system that was responsible for the catastrophic failure observed previously is again being used. (b) An example of attempts to improve seismic performance by reinforcing CMU walls. the lateral system. With respect to the overall structural scheme, there was very little change, and it is expected that the behavior of such construction would closely mimic what was seen in the house that collapsed on this same site earlier that year.
There were, however, examples of sound design and re-construction practices in Léo-gâne. One site, a commercial property on the outskirts of town was being supervised by tradesman with formal construction training from a university in Port-au-Prince. Due to this training and the ability of the owners to invest a significant amount of money in materials in the aftermath of the recent earthquake, the reinforced concrete frame that was being constructed had many improvements. As shown in Figure 21 , the columns included capitals at the slab interface and were cast freestanding with quality formwork. Columns measured approximately 30x30 cm (12x12 in) with greater amounts of longitudinal and transverse reinforcement, though hooks were still at right angles. The system used CMU infill walls that were also being reinforced, with evidence of vertical rebar anchored into the slabs. Clearly quality building materials and construction practices are present in Haiti, but again the costs associated with them make them unavailable to the vast majority of Haitians for their own private residences. Figure 20 . New practice of partitioning CMU walls, note the construction sequence: placement of column rebar cage, construction of wall to mid-height (foreground), placement of horizontal rebar cage tied in to column rebar cage and casting of "beam" (foreground), placement of formwork and casting of column to its mid-height (background). The wall would then continue to be constructed to the full column height, and the concrete would be cast to complete the top half of the column. Note also in the foreground how the pour was simply discontinued when materials on site were exhausted and the site was inactive at the time the photo was taken.
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NEEDS FOR RECONSTRUCTION
Haiti faces a tough road to recovery after this devastating natural disaster; however they are also presented with a rare and invaluable opportunity. The destruction and loss of life have provided a motivation to reverse the practices that led to this tragedy, provided the response appropriately considers the many nonengineering constraints that led to these practices. It is clear that changes are required in almost every aspect of the design and construction process. The approach to this, though, is just as important as the changes themselves. Without an understanding of the Haitian culture, society, and attitudes, efforts with be, at best, feeble. Certainly, confined masonry systems as well as even reinforced load-bearing masonry walls have been aseismically engineered throughout the developing world and certainly would be a natural next step for Haitian reconstruction due to the pre-existing pools of masons. This would of course necessitate that higher quality masonry be available as well as adequate quantities of reinforcing steel. For some comparatively wealthier Haitians, this may be indeed feasible. However, wide spread promotion of these construction modalities for all Haitian urban housing could be disastrous, as many do not have the resources to invest in making these systems effective against earthquakes. Given the uniqueness of Haiti's challenges, particularly with respect to the availability of wood and extreme poverty and lack of codification and education, these potential solutions must be flanked by the development of completely new materials, structural systems and construction modalities, 
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learning from past experiences that underscore best practices in adoption, incentivization and training (Dowling 2004) . Moreover, the approach to rebuilding must be one that empowers, giving the Haitian people not only an active role in the decision making process but also the tools and knowledge to become self-reliant. When considering that the majority of structures lost were residential, then one of the most pressing needs is for sustainable, multihazard resilient urban homes. The use of locally available materials, constructed using local labor and trades, is an engineering problem that will require innovative solutions and precludes simply "importing" International Building Codes or extrapolating systems that have worked elsewhere as a "one size fits all" solution. Further it must be done with active engagement of the local community from the outset, in order to avoid resistance and criticisms that have plagued similar well-intentioned recovery efforts, such as seen after the 1999 Molise, Italy earthquake (Maffei and Bazzurro 2004) . Finally, the rebuilding effort must appropriately leverage the role of non governmental organizations (NGOs; Murty 2005), who could play an integral role in education and training programs to guide the existing local capacity for masonry construction toward more seismically appropriate systems, for example, confined masonry or reinforced load bearing masonry walls.
Motivated by these thoughts, and under the umbrella of Notre Dame's new Committed to Haiti initiative (http://committedtohaiti.nd.edu/), a comprehensive master planning and recovery effort is being directed toward Léogâne that unites a number of universities, private sector partners and NGOs with local residents and community leaders. The authors, as a part of this effort, are overseeing the development of multihazard-resilient housing that is culturally acceptable and can be sustained based on locally available materials, engineering training, and construction skills. This process includes two elements, first the development of the housing model and second its implementation, which includes education and training of local foremen, architects, engineers and master builders. The second stage is perhaps the most important to achieve the ultimate goal of empowering the nation of Haiti to rebuild with the proper knowledge and training to avoid similar devastation in future earthquakes. The authors were able to document three models for construction teams that must be considered as education, training and implementation activities unfold. The first is the skilled foreman model, where one person has formal training from a university and instructs the rest of the team. This model works well, however because of the value placed on such expertise, these construction teams are too costly for most residential construction, and instead are used mainly in commercial projects, such as that shown in Figure 21 . The second model is an apprentice model, where the trade is passed down through generations of a family. This model was more evident in the wealthier residential construction in Léogâne, as shown in Figure 19 . Finally, the last model employs a master builder, one person in a community that helps everyone to build their homes. This was the most prominent theme in the poorer areas, shown in Figure 6 , and therefore is used widely in Haiti. The master builder is rarely formally trained, but has some idea of construction technique either through their own experience or experience passed down by family and friends. As a result of these models and the lack of formal education, licensure, and oversight mechanisms within them, there is no single pathway for disseminating knowledge and new technologies.
With respect to the housing model, the case studies repeatedly demonstrate that the CMU walls directly or indirectly led to the failure of most structures. They dictated the dimension of columns, were not reinforced, often sustained significant damage, increased the seismic mass of the structure, and in many cases created a mechanism by which shear forces were ultimately transferred into the columns. The development of an alternative partitioning system will serve as one of the first elements of the authors' housing model. Since other lightweight foam concrete partitioning that has been introduced post-quake in areas like India (Jain 2002) will likely not be economically viable, the authors are exploring simple manufacturing processes that convert waste, from trash to recyclables to agricultural byproducts, into compressed panels. In particular, the re-use of trash is attractive as a remedy to another societal problem plaguing most Haitian cities. By working with global development and entrepreneurial institutes at Notre Dame, these new manufacturing processes can be introduced to spur local economic development.
The alternate portioning system will alleviate some of the issues presented by CMU, which will still be used in fencing of property boundaries, etc., but will now present the requirement for quality formwork to allow appropriate sizing of columns and construction of free standing moment resisting frames. Again the deforestation problem makes this a particular challenge that will be addressed using reusable, communal formwork developed appropriately for the various classes of housing in Léogâne, ranging from the single story lower income housing to the larger, multistory affluent housing. Admittedly the adoption of such a paradigm necessitates a shift in mindset toward a communal approach to building and shared resources that is foreign to many Haitians, but in conjunction with social scientists and experts in Haitian culture, a prototype program will be launched in Léogâne as part of this process.
The economic constraints may still preclude resilient reinforced concrete construction for lower-income developments. To this end, alternate materials such as bamboo are being explored, given that the climate of Haiti is well suited to support this crop and the growing cycle is relatively fast. Two-story residential units framed in bamboo have already been shown to perform well in the 1999 earthquake in Colombia (Fierro 2000) and as a reinforcing element in aseismically designed adobe housing in El Salvador (Dowling 2004) . This material could be a viable alternative for use in lower-income housing, possibly in conjunction with the new partitioning system, given the shortage of wood in Haiti and would introduce yet another industry that could help spur the local economy.
CONCLUSIONS
As in any country, Haitian housing trends are predicated on cultural and environmental requirements, subject to practical constraints related to the lack of native resources, income, education and government oversight. These factors provide an important context to understanding the causes for the widespread destruction after the January 2010 earthquake, as well as viable strategies for rebuilding. For Haiti these requirements and the constraints they impose create what may be the most difficult reconstruction effort following any major disaster, not due to a lack of funding or good intentions, but due to the lack of infrastructure needed to disseminate knowledge and best practices regarding hazard resilience. This is even more challenging given the fact that future designs must be approached from a multihazard perspective due to the regular threat posed by tropical storms. This paper presented the observations of a team from the University of Notre Dame as they engaged in reconnaissance in March and August 2010 with specific focus on residential housing in the city of
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Léogâne. While lack of resources and economic constraints in any country will introduce poor construction practices and the use of inferior materials (Haiti is no different in this regard), the intersection of a number of cultural preferences, environmental requirements, and constraints posed by natural resources and economics resulted in some unique features in Haitian residential construction that is highly partitioned with concrete masonry units (CMU) and built incrementally as finances are available. It is important to acknowledge that CMUs were not strictly used as a nonstructural element, but rather as an integral element of the construction process erected prior to the columns in a system devoid of beams and lacking the many details necessary to achieve confined masonry construction. As such, despite the number of stories or clear-span, the cross sectional dimension of the columns was dictated by CMU and was in no way integrated with the columns to bolster the system's resilience. Further economic constraints resulted in minimal reinforcement, particularly with respect to transverse stirrups. The resulting undersized, poorly confined columns lacked sufficient capacity for the seismic demands in these relatively heavy structures, a situation compounded by their frequent receipt of large forces as these stiff yet brittle CMU walls failed in shear. These CMU walls posed a recurring threat whose shear failures produced substantial damage and injury, and their partial implementation induced classic "short column" effects even in engineered structures. In more affluent residences in Léogâne, the limitations of this structural system were immediately apparent as the slabs were unable to engage columns and form an effective unified lateral system. Based on these observations, and in light of the unique requirements and constraints levied on Haitian residential construction, the authors are now engaged in an effort to develop a new multihazard-resilient housing model that can be sustained based on locally available materials, engineering training, and construction skills with the goal of long-term implementation in Léogâne.
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